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Abstract I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a 
normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is 
sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or 
merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified 
as an intended means or end. 
 
As I write – it is the beginning of August 2014 – the IDF is continuing its operation to 
demilitarize the Gaza stripe. It has been, no matter your politics, tragic: international 
media outlets speak of around 1400 deaths in Gaza and around 60 Israelis fatalities.2 
 
The political situation is very complicated, maybe too complicated for an ethical 
analysis. That is why for the purposes of this paper, I will greatly simplify it: civilians are 
dying. Whether the death of civilians is being aimed at appears to make a legitimate 
difference to the normative evaluation of events. Whether civilian deaths are being 
aimed at (which for the purposes of this paper should be understood to be 
interchangeable with ‘intended’) is an empirical question: a question which this paper 
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cannot answer (my own personal impression from media reports is that it is quite 
obvious that Hamas rockets are aimed at civilians and that it is an open question if and 
how many civilian deaths are aimed at by the IDF). The question addressed in this 
paper is therefore not the difficult empirical question of whether civilian deaths are 
being aimed at in this particular conflict; it is rather the normative status of aiming at 
civilian deaths in armed conflicts more in general. 
 
The distinction between killing civilians in the context of an armed conflict without 
aiming at their death and killing civilians in the context of an armed conflict by aiming 
at their death is an old one: it can be traced back at least to Aquinas and maybe even 
to Aristotle (Di Nucci 2014a & 2014b); and it has close links to one of the pillars of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, the Ten Commandments, one of which is against killing. The 
so-called Doctrine of Double Effect, which I criticize in this paper, has arisen exactly as 
an attempt to reconcile some killing with the Ten Commandments.  
 
The problem is easy to see: the prohibition against killing is very general; it does not 
mention kinds of killings or different circumstances so that, on the face of it, it does 
not allow for any exceptions. But then how can it possibly be reconciled with killing in 
war or killing in self-defense (or, for that matter, with euthanasia)? An easy way out 
may be a radical non-violent stance (but even that would face the problem of not 
allowing for violence rather than just not provoking violence). And anyway, not very 
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many people would be in a position to preach and practice radical non-violence 
coherently.  
 
This is then how the search for a criterion which would allow for some exceptions to a 
general prohibition starts: and the Doctrine of Double Effect is one such criterion. It 
says, in its most general formulation, that in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally 
permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: 
the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end. The crucial 
distinction is, in short, between bringing about intended harm and bringing about 
unintended harm: the latter appears to be less ethically problematic than the former; 
to the extent that the latter may sometimes be justified, the former is on the other 
hand never justifiable according to the Doctrine.3  
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 Here some representative definitions of double effect: 
1) McIntyre in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “sometimes it is permissible to bring about as a 
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Applying this distinction to killing, we get the following: intended killing is never 
justifiable, while there are conditions under which unintended killing may be justified. 
Aquinas, for example, famously argued that in cases of self-defense, we may 
sometimes make an exception to the general prohibition against killing because we do 
not intend to kill the aggressor: the killing is praeter intentionem (see footnote 3).  
 
It is also easy to see what an important role this distinction plays within the general 
dialectic between deontological and consequentialistic approaches in ethics: 
distinguishing between intended killings and unintended killings and arguing that 
general prohibitions against killing are only meant for intended killings preempts 
classic utilitarian counterexamples: and war and self-defense could be taken to be 
some such counterexamples. In an important way, then, double effect considerations 
are a Kantian reply to utilitarian counterexamples, so their place is at the heart of 
moral theory.  
 
It is therefore very important to establish whether a normative distinction between 
intended harm and unintended harm is plausible. Here I offer eight arguments against 
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this distinction to argue that we should abandon the Doctrine of Double Effect: I take 
each of these eight arguments to be, alone, sufficient to show that the Doctrine of 
Double Effect should be abandoned. First of all let me say, though, that I will not have 
the chance to get into much detail in this short paper: for more information on each of 
these arguments, please see my new book Ethics Without Intention, where these eight 
arguments and the Doctrine of Double Effect more in general are discussed in much 
greater detail.   
 
First argument: I show that the counterfactual test of intention fails to distinguish 
between intended means and merely foreseen side effects. Second argument: I 
present the argument from marginally bad means, according to which the Doctrine 
implausibly rules against cases where the intended means are morally negligible. Third 
argument: I dispute the moral intuitions that are supposed to motivate the Doctrine, 
as for example killing one to save five in trolley cases (I also present some empirical 
data against those intuitions). Fourth argument: I show that the problem of closeness 
makes the Doctrine unworkable because we can always argue that the agent did not 
intend the bad means. Fifth argument: I defend a counterexample to the Doctrine – 
the so-called Loop Variant – from Frances Kamm’s recent attempt to deal with it by 
arguing that means are not necessarily intended: I show that Kamm’s distinction 
between ‘in order to’ and ‘because of’ means does not work. Sixth argument: I show 
that influential thought experiments in the double effect literature, such as Terror 
Bomber & Strategic Bomber, face a dilemma: either there is no moral difference 
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between the two consequentialistically identical cases – so that the Doctrine draws a 
moral distinction without a difference – or the moral difference is explained by 
normative considerations which are more fundamental than the distinction between 
intended means and merely foreseen side effects. Seventh argument: I argue that the 
Doctrine provides no moral guidance because it cannot tell us what to do; it is 
therefore a useless normative principle. Eighth argument: I argue that the Doctrine 
fails even if we water it down to a responsibility attribution principle. 
 
First argument 
The counterfactual test of intention is one (superficial) way in which one could try to 
distinguish between intended means and merely foreseen side effects, and therefore 
one possible argument for the fundamental distinction behind the Doctrine of Double 
Effect. The idea is that to test whether some effect is intended one should ask what 
the agent would do in a parallel scenario where everything is the same apart from the 
fact that somehow the agent’s action no longer brings about that effect: if the agent 
would no longer perform the relevant action, then that effect was intended. 
 
Let us take the effect of civilian deaths in armed conflict. The test asks us to check 
whether the actions causing those civilian deaths (say rockets or air strikes) would be 
performed even if they – for whatever reason – were known not to have the effect in 
question: if yes, then the effect is not intended; if no, then the effect is intended. And 
one could indeed try to argue that Hamas rockets known not to cause harm to civilians 
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would not be launched (because that’s the point of those strikes) but that IDF missions 
known not to harm civilians would still be carried out because their aim is to 
demilitarize Gaza or defeat Hamas or whatever.  
 
Apart from the historical accuracy of these considerations, here we see the difficulty 
with the counterfactual test and at the same time the difference between 
distinguishing intended harm from unintended harm on the one hand and 
distinguishing intended harm as ends or means from unintended harm as side-effect 
on the other hand. Hamas rockets are supposed to weaken Israel by targeting civilians, 
so that civilian deaths are an intended means to some other end: therefore it is easy to 
imagine that, if for whatever reason those rockets would be known to weaken Israel 
without causing civilian deaths, the rockets would still be launched – showing, 
according to the counterfactual test, that those civilian deaths are not intended. So the 
counterfactual test fails as an argument in favor of the Doctrine of Double Effect 
because instead of distinguishing between intended means or ends on the one hand 
and unintended side-effects on the other, it just distinguishes between means and 
ends.  
 
Second argument 
This is easy. The Doctrine of Double Effect is implausible because it does not allow for 
only marginally bad means. A general prohibition against all intended harm is just 
implausible: sometimes the harm is so negligible and the consequence so beneficial, 
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that it would be crazy not to allow the negligible harm in question; but the Doctrine of 
Double Effect does not have the resources to allow for negligible intended harm, as 
when I push my friend over in order to save him from being run over; I may have 
caused him to sprain his ankle, but nobody would condemn my behavior: indeed, in 
the absence of alternatives, everybody in their right mind would praise me for having 
pushed him over.  
 
Third argument 
My third argument against double effect is best summarized by presenting some data I 
have collected on moral intuitions on double effect cases. 
 
See elsewhere for details on these experiments (Di Nucci 2013c & Di Nucci 2014a). 
Here just a very quick summary. Trolley cases, in which we kill one to save five, are 
often thought to be evidence of the intuitive appeal of double effect; in my 
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experiments I show that it is far from obvious that people have, in trolley cases, 
intuitions that support the Doctrine of Double Effect, as a majority of subjects in my 
study do not opt to kill the one to save five. Intuitions are very important in the debate 
on double effect because the argument for a normative distinction between intending 
harm and merely foreseeing harm is based on supposed moral intuitions about 
particular cases such as the trolley problem. 
 
Fourth argument 
According to the problem of closeness, the normative distinction between intending 
harm and merely foreseeing harm is unworkable because we can always argue that the 
relevant harm was merely foreseen and the Doctrine of Double Effect offers no 
criterion to rule out any of these cases: so that (to take one of Philippa Foot’s famous 
scenarios) if we blow up a fat guy to pieces whose body is obstructing the exit of the 
cave where we are stuck, then we can say that the death of the fat guy was a merely 
foreseen (unintended) consequence of freeing up the cave’s mouth – and the Doctrine 
has no criterion to stop this and endless other implausible applications.  
 
Fifth argument 
As we have already mentioned, the trolley problem is thought to provide evidence in 
favor of double effect in so far as we can say that we do not intend to kill the one, we 
only intend to divert the trolley to save the five and we merely foresee that diverting 
the trolley will kill the one. This account has been challenged by Judith Thomson’s so-
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called Loop Variant, where the side track leads back to the main track so that when we 
divert the trolley to save the five, if the one had not been on the side track, the five 
would have been run over by the trolley from the other side: killing the one in the Loop 
Variant really is a means to the end of saving the five, then.  
 
Frances Kamm (2007) has recently addressed this issue by distinguishing between ‘in 
order to’ means and ‘because of’ means, where only the former are prohibited while 
the latter kind of means may sometimes be allowed. According to Kamm, the Loop 
Variant is an example of the latter kind of means: we do not divert the trolley in order 
for it to hit the one; but we divert the trolley because it will hit the one: namely, if we 
thought that it would not hit the one we would not divert, but that does not imply, 
according to Kamm, that we aim at hitting the one. But the crucial question is whether 
we intend to hit the one: Kamm must show that we do not intend to hit the one even 
though we need him to be hit in order to save the five. And in Ethics Without Intention 
I show that Kamm fails to prove that in the Loop Variant we do not intend to hit the 
one (Di Nucci 2014a, Chapter Seven).  
 
Sixth argument 
Double effect faces a dilemma: take two consequentialistically identical cases, such as 
the often used scenario of the Terror Bomber and the Strategic Bomber, both of which 
bomb a munitions’ factory and a school, while only the Terror Bomber but not the 
Strategic Bomber intended to bomb the school. Either there is no moral difference 
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between the two bomber pilots, because Terror Bomber would have planned and 
acted just like Strategic Bomber had she too received the orders that Strategic Bomber 
received (or had she too been in the circumstances that Strategic Bomber was in; or 
had she too had the motives that Strategic Bomber had) – and in that cases the 
Doctrine of Double Effect would draw a normative distinction where there is no moral 
difference; or the moral difference between Strategic Bomber and Terror Bomber is 
explained by something more fundamental than a difference in plans, strategy, or 
intention: for example a despicable motive or prejudice which one pilot has but the 
other one lacks.  
 
Seventh argument 
The Doctrine of Double Effect is a useless moral principle, because it does not tell us 
how we may permissibly act. Suppose that a member of the IDF asks herself whether 
or not she may kill civilians within military operations: to answer that she may kill 
civilians only on the condition that the killing of those civilians is only an unintended 
side effect of her actions is no answer at all; how is one supposed to make sure that 
one only merely foresees the killing of civilians rather than intending it while planning 
a military operation? Much more plausible and useful than the Doctrine of Double 
Effect is, in this context, the following principle: the probability of civilian deaths 
should be kept as low as possible. But this very vague principle, which military ethicists 
must then fill with normative content, is very different from the Doctrine of Double 
Effect.  
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Eighth argument 
Let us briefly look at my final argument against the Doctrine of Double Effect: after 
seven arguments against double effect as a principle of moral justification, one may 
wonder whether the point of the Doctrine is a different one, namely responsibility 
attribution, so that unintended harm should be blamed less than intended harm. In 
Chapter Twelve of Ethics Without Intention I argue that whether or not the harm is 
intended as ends or means or merely foreseen as a side effect makes no difference to 
responsibility attributions. Agents are not only responsible for their intended 
intentional actions but also for their unintended intentional actions: indeed, agents are 
also responsible for more than just their intentional actions, so that all of the actions 
between which double effect proposes to distinguish are actions for which agents are 
responsible.  
 
Still, there is a domain within which considerations similar to those motivating double 
effect may legitimately play a role. Think of the difference between convicting and 
sentencing in legal philosophy: we may speak of a moral correlate of sentencing where 
a person A has to decide what to make of her relationship with person B in light of a 
certain action of B. The question is, at that stage, no longer whether or not B intended 
to do that thing or whether she has done it intentionally or whether B is culpable or 
responsible for the action in question: all these questions have been already settled 
and A is simply asking herself what to – now – make of B and their relationship in light 
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of what B has done. I think that at this stage it is both normal and fair to look at the 
attitudes and motives of B, for example for the question of whether or not to forgive B.  
 
In conclusion: don’t ask yourself whether or not civilian deaths were intended as ends 
or means or merely foreseen as side effects if you want to know if a particular 
operation is justified. As my arguments against double effect show, that is the wrong 
question to ask if what you are after are answers to issues of both permissibility and 
responsibility.  
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